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 Public service outsourcing and its employment implications 
in an era of austerity: The case of British social care 
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Utilising an institutional, inter-organisational and inter-personal framework, 
longitudinal qualitative data are used to examine the changing nature of state – 
voluntary sector relationships in the area of social care outsourcing and its 
implications for the terms and conditions of those employed by Scottish voluntary 
organisations. Over the period 2002 to 2008/09, against the background of funders 
seeking to pass on efficiencies to voluntary organisations, these relationships have 
become increasingly cost-based and ‘arms-length’. This has been accompanied by 
downward pressures on staff terms and conditions, which are intensifying because of 
more draconian public expenditure cuts. Consequently, voluntary sector employers 
are increasingly converging on an employment model based on low pay and more 
limited access to sickness, pension and other benefits that is informed strongly by 
narrow financial logics. 
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Introduction 
 
In an era of increased outsourcing of goods and services to external suppliers, 
attention has been paid to the implications this has for employees within supplier/ 
provider organisations (Marchington et al, 2005; Rubery et al, 2003). This research 
has shown such implications to vary considerably.  It has further revealed them to be 
contingent on the nature of the relationships between purchasers and providers that 
are themselves shaped by a range of inter-related institutional, inter-organisational 
and inter-personal factors (Marchington and Vincent, 2004: Vincent, 2005).  
 
Much of this research, despite its value, has been located within a fixed point in time, 
thereby limiting our understanding of the dynamics of change within the institutional, 
inter-organisational and inter-personal arenas. More particularly, it means that we 
have limited understanding of how these three dimensions of inter-organisational 
relations change during periods of economic and regulatory shocks and subsequently 
impact on employment conditions, especially in supplier firms. 
 
This paper seeks to shed light on these gaps in our knowledge through an exploration 
of one of the most significant areas of outsourcing growth, both in the UK and 
overseas, namely the transference of public services delivery to voluntary 
organisations. It does so by drawing upon longitudinal qualitative research undertaken 
in Scottish voluntary organisations between 2002 – 2008/09 to explore the following 
questions.  
 
 (a) How (and why) have state – voluntary sector outsourcing relationships been 
changing over the past decade, including during the current era of public sector 
financial austerity;  
 
(b) In what ways have voluntary organisations sought to adapt to the changes taking 
place? and  
 
(c) What has been the impact of these changes on the terms and conditions of 
employment of those working in voluntary organisations? (These questions might be 
more effective placed right up front in the article) 
 
 
Findings from the first phase of research revealed how voluntary organisations existed 
along a continuum encompassing varying combinations of ‘arms-length’ and 
obligational elements. This variation was, in turn, associated with differences in their 
ability to protect terms and conditions of employment from the cost saving tendencies 
of the New Public Management (NPM) based quasi-market in care. Later phases of 
the research, however, illustrated that changing inter-organisational relations driven 
by austerity and retendering were leading to the imperatives of cost savings 
subverting institutional mechanisms that previously favoured the construction of 
obligational relations between the parties. As a result, the boundaries between 
organisations along the ‘arms-length’ (short-term, insecure funding, cost-based 
relations) – obligational (joint, mutuality based, partnership working, less emphasis 
on measurement, a greater acceptance of non-specific outcomes, and relatively high 
levels of funding security) spectrum were beginning to erode, with even previously  
relatively secure voluntary organisations converging around employment regimes 
based on low pay, and the erosion of other terms and conditions of employment. 
 
What follows is divided into five main sections. In the first, we outline the 
institutional, inter-organisational and inter-personal framework developed by 
Marchington and Vincent (2004) to analyse the factors shaping contracting relations 
between purchasers and suppliers, along with its virtues. This is followed by an 
outline of how these factors shape British social care outsourcing and relations 
between state and voluntary sector against a background of current government 
austerity measures in the public sector. The potential employment implications of 
these changing relationships are then discussed, while sections three and four 
respectively outline the methodology of the authors’ study and report its key findings. 
Finally, these findings are drawn together and their implications discussed.   
 
Inter-organisational relations: forms and determinants 
 
Relations between the purchasers and providers of public services can, as with other 
supply chains, be characterised by power imbalances embedded in arms-length 
market exchanges that are of a price based, short-term, transactional nature  – labelled 
‘market bureaucracies’ (Considine and Lewis, 2003; Adler, 2001; Sako, 1992). Such 
relations, however, can also extend to encompass more long-term, qualitative 
obligational elements (Considine, 1996; Reeves, 2008; Lavoie et al, 2010). 
  
As with similar classifications, such as that drawn between ‘arms-length’ and 
‘obligational’ contracting, the available evidence indicates that these different types of 
 contractual arrangements should be viewed as lying at each end of a spectrum of 
relationships (Sako, 1992; Adler, 2001: Grimshaw et al, 2002). It further highlights 
such arrangements to be shaped by a range of institutional, inter-organisational and 
inter-personal influences (Marchington and Vincent, 2004).  
 
More specifically, Marchington and Vincent identify how obligational type relations 
are produced and reproduced as a consequence of institutional forces forging common 
obligations on both parties. That is, there is a mutual dependency between the parties 
based upon a degree of trust, risk sharing, information disclosure and sharing, joint 
problem solvingand long-term relationships. Mutuality between the parties is based 
around strong dependency by purchasers on a provider’s niche, quality 
products/services, and the latter’s need to retain the former as a customer. These 
relations are further supported by long-term contractual relations and agents from 
each party having close personal ties and working on joint projects including 
secondments (Sako, 1992; Adler, 2001). At the same time, the character of inter-
organisational relations, most notably the nature of the goods and services being 
supplied and the relative dependency of the contracting parties, are also seen to be 
highly influential. These two factors although recognised as the most dominant, are, 
in turn, seen to be influenced by the activities of boundary spanning agents and how 
they develop practice and relations between organisations over the long term 
(Marchington and Vincent, 2004).  
 
Research lends clear support to this framework. For example, it shows how the wider 
institutional contexts within which supply chain relationships are established can 
differ considerably with regard to the extent to which they facilitate collaborative, as 
opposed to more adversarial, relations between buyers and sellers (Sako, 1992; Lane, 
1997). Meanwhile, the interplay between the cultural and material characteristics (and 
associated interests) of the contracting parties, as well as the history of past relations 
between them, have been found to exert a crucial influence in this respect (Hunter et 
al, 1996).  There is evidence, for example, that purchasers are less likely to seek 
‘arms-length’ relationships where relevant suppliers are in short supply, the goods/ 
services to be supplied are of relatively high strategic importance, and there is a good 
deal of mutual dependency between purchasers and suppliers (Gereffi et al, 2005; 
Cousins and Lawson, 2007). Finally, it has been noted that such institutional and 
inter-organisational influences can potentially not only structure the nature of the 
interactions occurring between boundary-spanning agents working across 
organisational lines, but also be mediated by them (Williams, 2002): even to the point 
where such interactions potentially lead to the sustaining of otherwise dysfunctional 
business relationships (Van de Ven et al, 1989). 
 
From an analytical perspective, this multi-level approach highlights the need to 
analyse inter-organisational contractual relations, not only in relation to the economic 
rationales and related market forces, but also in the context of the way in which these 
interact with surrounding institutional structures and norms, as well as the activities of 
boundary spanning agents. The framework’s authors, nevertheless recognise that there 
remain gaps in our understanding of inter-organisational relations. In particular, it has 
been argued that more information is needed on how such relations, and their 
employment implications, adjust in the face of specific types of regulatory change 
(Vincent, 2005) and also in periods of economic downturn, where it is likely that the 
weaker party (usually the supplier) becomes more vulnerable and exposed to the risks 
 in the market (Marchington and Vincent, 2005). The next section therefore outlines 
how the voluntary sector, and more particularly the Scottish social care market, 
provides a useful focus of analysis for these issues. 
 
Inter-organisational relations in the Scottish social care 
market and its employment implications 
 
Outsourcing to voluntary sector organisations has been shaped by powerful 
institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) flowing from a neoliberal, New 
Public Management (NPM) agenda. That is an agenda encompassing the advocacy of 
market based competition in public services, demands for cost savings, efficiency and 
value for money, and the encouragement of a more ‘business-like’ approach to 
management (Cunningham, 2008; Hemmings, 2011). At the same time, it has also 
occurred alongside other competing institutional pressures from the state, leading to 
conflicting demands and a fragmentation of state controls (Oliver, 1991). The NPM 
agenda in the UK has, for example, existed alongside a desire to capture a number of 
alleged virtues of voluntary organisations in delivering public service provision, such 
as closeness to clients, independence and innovativeness, through the promotion of 
closer, ‘partnership working’ (Davies, 2009). Consequently, the NPM agenda has co-
existed with government attempts to influence, not to say constrain, some of the 
contracting behaviour of service commissioners that can undermine these virtues. 
This has been undertaken through institutional rhetoric around ‘partnership’ with the 
sector and mechanisms intended to support the development of more obligational 
relationships. These are contractual relationships that are relatively lengthy, marked 
by a substantial degree of mutuality, and embodying high levels of trust, and which 
accord a priority to quality (rather than just cost) issues (see e.g. Sako, 1992). These 
mechanisms having included the advocacy of longer term funding arrangements, the 
co-production of services and the promulgation of the principle that funding should 
provide voluntary organisations with ‘full cost recovery’ (Audit Commission, 2007; 
National Audit Office, 2005; H.M Treasury, 2002; Home Office, 2005). 
 
Data shows a substantial degree of dependence in the UK voluntary sector on state 
income. Thus, in England the sector’s income during 2007/08 stood at £35.5 billion, 
with that from statutory sources accounting for £12.8 billion of this – a little over one 
third of the total (Funding Commission, 2010; NVCO, 2010).  In Scotland, where the 
focus of this study is located, public sector funding was higher constituting just over 
40 per cent during the year 2008-9. 
 
Against the background of an overall rise in statutory income over the period 2000/01 
to 2007/08 the English voluntary sector saw a growing proportion (from 50 to 71 
percent) of this income arising from contracts rather than grants, with the former type 
of funding amounting to 26 per cent of total income. While a similar detailed 
breakdown is not available for Scotland, available statistics indicate that contract 
income rose as a proportion of total income from 18 to 23 percent over the period 
2006-7 to 2008-9. They also, however, indicate that, in contrast to England, grant 
income remains slightly higher than contract income (SCVO, 2010).  
 
 It can be further seen that significant employment growth has occurred as funding 
from the state has increased. Thus, over the period 2001 to 2010 the UK voluntary 
sector workforce increased from 547,000 to 765,000, a rise of two-fifths (Clark et al, 
2011) The majority of employees in the sector are situated in the larger organisations, 
with women accounting for over two thirds of that workforce. Moreover, almost four 
in 10 of those in the workforce are part-timers. If attention is focused more narrowly 
on social care, there has also been significant change in workforce numbers over this 
period. For example, the period 1996 – 2008 saw a significant increase in the number 
of sector workers employed in social work activities – from 202,000 to 374,000 – an 
increase of 85 percent (Clark and Wilding, 2011).  
 
This increase in employment is seen to reflect the transfer of social care services from 
the public to the voluntary sector (NCVO, 2009). It has consequently also coincided 
with a significant growth in the role of voluntary sector and other independent 
providers. In 1992, two percent of home care hours in England were delivered by 
private and voluntary organisations, but by 2005, this had increased to 73 percent. 
Moreover, by March 2006 80 percent of domiciliary care agencies were owned by 
voluntary or private providers (Davies, 2011). 
 
It does also, however, need to be noted that Scotland’s social care market has 
generally developed at a slower pace than England’s. Nevertheless, policies such as 
Best Value were introduced through the Local Government in Scotland Act (2003), 
along with various regulatory bodies such as the Care Commission and Scottish 
Social Services Skills Council (Harrow, 2009). In addition, the Scottish quasi-market 
between purchasers and providers, as in England, has been operationalised through 
service contracting, involving a competitive tender and contract mode, negotiated 
tenders, and to a lesser, but growing, extent individualised funding to service users 
through Direct Payments (Scottish Government, 2010). 
 
Several regulatory changes have more recently added further complexity and tensions 
to the institutional environment of Scottish voluntary organisations. One has been the 
pursuit of a personalisation agenda in social care (Kessler and Bach, 2011; UNISON, 
2009), which commits local authorities and providers to transform social care around 
the objectives of choice, person-centeredness and individual care, via the provision of 
Direct Payments and Individual Budgets which enable people accessing services to 
choose and switch providers/carers (Leece, 2010). Although sharing characteristics of 
NPM, such as ‘choice’, power to the user and lower costs, personalisation also has 
strong civil rights elements emerging in response to demands for recognition and 
autonomy from the disability rights movement (Needham, 2011). These latter civil 
rights aspects of personalisation can be seen to represent a potential ideological force 
promoting common interests between local authority service commissioners and 
voluntary sector providers. 
 
Another external regulatory change threatening to push the parties to more arms-
length relations has been the Public Contracts Regulations 2006 (and Public Contracts 
(Scotland) Regulations 2006), introduced to transpose the Public Contracts Directive 
2004/18/EC. Thus, in supporting the re-tendering of services from one provider to 
another, these regulations add to the NPM inspired climate of insecurity faced by 
providers, while also increasing opportunities for purchasers to obtain competitively 
generated reductions in contract prices (Cunningham and Nickson, 2009). 
  
In this contradictory institutional context, it is useful to distinguish between two 
different levels of pressure.   The first of these relate to the meta-environmental level 
that embody overall societal frameworks and attitudes to the voluntary sector, 
including national government policies. The second refer to macro-level ones which 
operate within the immediate organisational field of organisations such as local 
councils. Here local authorities by providing much of the sector’s funding also 
provide a range of locally generated quality standards to which voluntary 
organisations must adhere in order to gain legitimacy in regional markets. (Osborne, 
1998). NPM and ‘partnership’ represent meta-environmental influences shaped by 
central government, which are to some degree contradictory The key contradictions 
being how on the one hand ‘partnership’ involves joint purchaser- provider 
discussions around quality of service provision, while NPM on the other involves an 
emphasis on the contradictory priorities of cost-cutting and continual drives for 
efficiencies asking ‘more for less’ from providers (Davies, 2011). Meanwhile, at the 
macro-level, local authorities are charged with operationalising this contradictory 
framework, as well as contributing to the construction of the 
‘institutional/organisational fields’ that provide access and legitimacy to voluntary 
organisations in the social care market through, for example, the quality standards 
previously mentioned. The term ‘organisational fields’ being defined in this context as 
a group of organisations that constitute a recognised area of institutional life, i.e. 
producing similar products and services, overseen by common regulatory agencies, 
and involve interaction of professional groups through the proliferation of various 
forums (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). As regulatory agencies, local authorities can 
therefore be seen to not only act as individual purchasers,  but also as architects of 
local contracting market places; a role that in turn highlights the need not to view 
contracting organisations as merely passive recipients of surrounding institutional 
pressures (Marchington and Vincent, 2004). 
 
Alongside such institutional dynamics, the inter-organisational dimension of social 
care contracting has itself been undergoing transformation. Many of the charities 
engaged in the delivery of public services are highly dependent on income derived 
from this activity (Clarke et al, 2009). Against this background, research suggests that 
they are often not well placed to act proactively by taking the initiative and shape the 
nature of the relationship they have with service commissioners (Johnson et al, 1998), 
many operating on a restricted geographical basis and therefore reliant on obtaining 
income from a relatively small number of (often much larger) local authority service 
commissioners (Charity Commission, 2007). 
 
This vulnerability has arguably been exacerbated by deteriorating market conditions 
arising from governmental responses to the 2008 financial crises. In June 2010, the 
UK coalition government of Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties announced 
£1.2bn of cuts in local government grants. Reports from the voluntary sector indicate 
that pressure for related cuts from funders quickly emerged as a consequence of this 
reduction in central government support (NCVO, 2010). In particular, a survey in 
2011 showed that 65 per cent of voluntary sector organisations expected their 
financial situation to worsen over the next twelve months (NCVO, 2011).  
Meanwhile, in Scotland, the devolved administration pledged to make £3.3 billion in 
savings over three years (almost 10 per cent of current spending) (Carrel, 2010) and 
similar cost saving pressures were anticipated.  
  
These shifting institutional and inter-organisational features can be reasonably 
anticipated to impact in turn on employment arrangements in non-profit organisations 
given evidence as to how supply chain relationships can have both positive and 
negative implications for employment regimes within provider organisations (see e.g. 
Scarborough, 2000; Beaumont et al, 1996; Truss, 2004; Parry and Kelliher, 2009; 
Wright and Lund, 2003; Cunningham and James, 2009). Thus, on the one hand, 
research has shown that purchasers can positively shape the management of provider 
staff by specifying training requirements, (minimum) pay rates and other employment 
conditions, and requiring the introduction of more empowering work systems and 
processes (Truss, 2004) . On the other hand, however, (other or the same research?) 
other research has also highlighted how, conversely, cost, delivery and quality 
pressures can more indirectly lead suppliers to marketise (McGovern, et al, 2007) 
their employment conditions  through worsening working time arrangements, 
increased casualisation, intensified workloads, and reduced staffing levels, pay and 
other employment conditions. 
 
In the context of the voluntary sector, it would consequently seem reasonable to 
postulate that the aforementioned changing patterns of inter-organisational relations 
will be leading to significant changes in employment conditions.  
 
Method 
 
The data for the study were gathered during two phases of fieldwork undertaken over 
the period between 2002 and 2008/090. Their longitudinal nature consequently both 
enable the shortcomings of ‘snapshot’ case studies to be overcome while also 
facilitating a rich understanding of the dynamic processes shaping the operation of the 
social care market place and its employment-related implications. 
 
Sixty-three semi-structured qualitative interviews were undertaken. In addition, 
supporting background information was obtained on the organisations within which 
interviews were conducted (see Table 2) and a range of relevant organisational 
documentation, such as annual reports, financial statements, and marketing and 
publicity materials, scrutinised.  
 
Table 1 outlines the profile of organisations within which these data were collected in 
terms of their activities. In the two phases of fieldwork, participants covered a range 
of services, while in each of them the majority of organisations claimed to recognise a 
union. Similar to the wider voluntary sector (see Clark and Wilding, 2011), the 
workforces within these organisations were largely female (with proportions ranging 
from two-thirds to eighty percent). In all of them front-line care work was delivered 
by paid staff, with volunteers involved largely in retail outlets and fund-raising. 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Phase one of the research (2002) involved interviews in 24 voluntary organisations. 
Those interviewed primarily encompassed either human resource (HR) staff (22 
cases) or operational managers responsible for personnel issues (2 cases). Further 
interviews with managers responsible for negotiations with local authorities were 
additionally undertaken (11 cases). Phase two of the research was undertaken in 
 2008/09 and involved interviews within 18 of the original 24 voluntary sector 
organisations. Those interviewed comprised HR respondents (17 cases) or managers 
with that responsibility (one case), as well as managers who were responsible for 
negotiating with local authorities (10 cases). 
 
In order to address the study’s central research questions, the interviews conducted 
during the first phase of fieldwork were designed to (a) elicit background profiles of 
the organisations within which they were undertaken, (b) provide data on the nature of 
the contractual relationships that the organisations had with service commissioners 
and how (and why) these were changing; (c) obtain information on how the 
organisations were reacting to such change; and (d) gather details of the way in which 
these (changing) relationships were impacting on employment policies and practices.  
 
All interviews were transcribed verbatim. From the first interviews the process of 
coding data into a framework began with a ‘start-list’ of codes, around the themes 
outlined in the previous paragraph. To aid this process, and influenced by Miles and 
Huberman’s approach (1994), ‘marginal remarks’ (pp, 67) were frequently used to 
highlight, clarify, reflect, and question various pieces of data. This led to revisions to 
the original codes.  
 
Findings 
 
Shifting institutional, inter-organisational and interpersonal boundaries of voluntary 
sector state relations 
 
In 2002, the institutional influence from the NPM agenda on the sector was apparent. 
Using the processes of constructing ‘approved provider lists’ (APLs - a list 
organisations had to be on to be considered by authorities to take on/bid for a 
contract), local authorities operationalising NPM were requiring voluntary 
organisations to adhere to new quality standards in service provision and become 
more ‘business like’ in their HR policies and practices, notably in relation to 
discipline, recruitment and equal opportunities. Consequently, such processes were 
forging uniformity in such practices across organisations eager to gain legitimacy and 
acceptance onto funders’ APLs. 
 
The competing institutional pressures of NPM and ‘partnership’ were producing a 
pattern of relationships between purchasers and providers characterised by 
complexity, and varying degrees of vulnerability among the latter to cost pressures 
from the competitive market. Nevertheless, government policies that encouraged three 
year contracts, discussions on quality of service and full funding of overhead costs, 
were found to generally be having a relatively limited impact on the climate of 
relations between service commissioners and providers.  
 
Table 2 outlines the variability in vulnerability to cost pressures from NPM among 
respondents from Phase 1 of the research. It can be seen that three Types of 
organisation could be identified, with Type 1 being the most vulnerable, and Type 2 
and 3 less so. State – voluntary sector relationship at this point were, therefore, like 
other inter-organisational relations, operating on a continuum, with  providers being 
able, under certain conditions, to influence their position along it.  
 
 The existence of these different organisational Types pointed to a varying capacity to 
resist powerful pressures from funding bodies. This capacity, and hence an 
organisation’s location on the above continuum, depended on the extent to which it 
was able to deploy one or more of the following methods to reduce resource 
dependence, and improve market and funding positions:  
 
 Building reputations as experts in niche services (e.g. children’s 
services) 
 Offsetting funding shortages in one area through subsidies from more 
generous contracts secured elsewhere. 
 Turning down ‘arms-length’ short-term, cost based contracts because 
of sufficient amounts of alternative work.  
 Drawing from their own resources (financial reserves, or the donation 
of a building) and using these resources to embark on ‘partnership’ 
projects with local authorities. 
 
Column 3 of Table 2 illustrates how the scope that existed to utilise such strategies 
varied. Only Type 3 organisations with more interdependent relations were able to 
make use of them all. In contrast, Type 2 employed one or two of them, while Type 1 
struggled to apply any.  It was also notable among Type 3 (and to some degree Type 
2) non-profits that their reputations as experts in niche services, and efforts to build 
partnerships were carefully developed, supported and sustained by close personal ties 
between organisational agents and representatives of various social service 
departments. This included incidences (among Type 3 respondents) of receiving 
phone calls asking about developing and establishing new services in partnership 
rather than embarking on a competitive exercise with other providers. 
 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
The 18 organisations that participated in Phase 2 of the fieldwork reported elements 
of continuity and change in the purchaser-provider relationship in 2008/09. Continuity 
came in the form of a continued dominance of the principles of NPM characterised by 
on-going funding insecurity through service commissioners not providing full-cost of 
living increases or imposing cuts or freezes in funding while demanding the same or 
improved levels of service. Other contributory factors were the short-term nature of 
the contracts awarded and the failure of organisations to receive ‘full-cost recovery’. 
The impact of these practices was often severe, with one organisation reporting how 
one in four of its eighty projects were operating on a deficit, compared to just four in 
2002. 
 
The EU Public Contracts Regulations 2006 were found to have added further NPM-
style pressure through introducing more competitive tendering and retendering for 
contracts. As a result, it had become more likely that organisations would experience 
the open tendering of their existing contracts, with the consequent greater risk of their 
loss and related financial and workforce consequences, or feel the need to bid for 
those held by other competing organisations. Private sector competitors were, for 
example, increasingly gaining contracts, including in children’s services. Re-
tendering and associated contract losses had at times resulted in significant financial 
losses, with one adult services respondent (Type 2) reporting a £4 million loss of 
income and over one hundred staff transferred to another organisation. Indeed, 
 retendering and competition could threaten the survival of some organisations. Thus, 
one Type 1 respondent was facing the prospect of all of its projects being retendered.  
 
Greater competition, in turn, commonly diminished previously close inter-personal 
relationships between purchaser and provider organisations. Several of the children’s 
services providers (Type 3 organisations) reported that not only had several existing 
services been retendered, but that they were now less likely to receive a phone call 
from close contacts to pilot new services as a member of a select group of providers. 
Instead, contracts were increasingly awarded on the basis of cost, with professional 
procurement teams from the finance and accountancy departments of local authorities 
managing such processes, rather than familiar officials from social services. Indeed, 
one provider outlined how having received the traditional phone call asking for advice 
on how to establish a new service (which was duly given), the purchaser then put the 
service out to tender and awarded it to another provider at a lower cost. 
 
In response to this changed funding environment in 2008/09 organisations invariably 
recognised the need to diversify funding and reduce resource dependency. Five had 
recruited ‘business development managers’ (BDMs) to respond to new tenders or 
retendering and another six had devolved responsibility for such matters to regional 
service managers/directors. Moreover, as part of moves to further commercialise and 
introduce more business-like cultures, regional managers were commonly provided 
with additional training in finance, negotiation and presentation skills: 
 
A lot of our core values remain the same, but the one that probably has come 
on-board is this notion of being more business-like. We need to start thinking 
about not just the quality of the service we deliver, but how do we deliver that 
quality of service in a value for money cost effective way (HR Director, 
children’s services). 
 
Other rare, but apparently effective, strategies included one respondent’s report of a 
collaboration between the Chief Executives of four organisations that led to them to 
refuse to apply for a tender because they had made an independent judgement, as 
heads of experienced providers, that the price at which the local authority was 
prepared to pay for the contract was too low to sustain an effective service. The 
respondent reported how these organisations were able to do this because they 
represented the ‘big five’ providers in children’s services, and hence had considerable 
market power. 
 
More generally, despite the ‘credit crunch’ one or two (Type 3) organisations 
continued to sustain themselves because of a high level of financial reserves.  
 
I think financially we have been fairly well off in terms of we do save for a 
rainy day. We have had good investments over the years. We have had good 
legacies that we have used to maximum effect (HR Director, children’s 
services). 
 
Others, however, continued to struggle and to face a situation in which market 
pressures led to cuts that in turn acted to compound them. For example, one Type 1 
organisation had, rather than cut front line services, dismissed its BDM, but 
subsequently faced difficulties gaining new business. 
  
The impact on employment policies  
 
Table 3 highlights how purchaser - provider relations were having a significant impact 
on pay and other terms and conditions of employment over the two stages of 
fieldwork. In 2002, the majority of organisations had moved away from public sector 
pay scales and introduced new rates based on some nominal notion of a ‘going rate’, 
sometimes with no associated increments, or with increments tied to skills acquisition. 
Where unions were present, collective bargaining could still occur if management was 
able to award some form of cost of living increase. Table 3 also reveals how in 2002 
not all of the 24 organisations were equally vulnerable to this shift away from public 
sector pay. 
 
Table 4 shows how in Phase 2 of research - 2008/09, eight respondents were drawn 
from the group that in Phase 1 had moved away from using national local authority 
(SJC) pay scales (a mixture of Type 1 and 2 respondents), while the remaining 10 
organisations were drawn from those that had remained aligned to public sector terms 
and conditions (mixture of Type 2 and 3 respondents). It also, however, shows how 
all those in this second group were considering changing their approach to pay 
because of tighter funding regimes by setting pay rises, where they could be offered, 
at a lower percentage rate than in the local authority sector and/or introducing new 
pay bands. 
 
The aforementioned organisation that was running deficits in one in four of its 
projects, and previously had maintained the link with public sector pay scales 
‘through thick and thin’ (HR Director) was anticipating being unable to do so in 
2008/09, and was also recruiting lower paid support assistants, rather than support 
workers. There were also problems emerging among organisations from Type 3 
organisations that were on the ‘inside track’ of funding. In one of these, where a new 
reward structure was being introduced at the time of the interviews, the senior 
accountant  outlined how the introduction of narrower pay bands was designed to 
reduce future pay inflation to secure ‘the long-term survival of the trust’ (Senior 
Accountant). 
 
In addition,  all eighteen organisations, whether they paid public sector rates or not, 
were striving to make savings to wider employment conditions including through 
pensions, sick pay, downtime and travel allowances, and the recruitment of lower paid 
and skilled support assistants. Changes to pension and sick pay arrangements targeted 
new starts, for example, through removing entitlements that mirrored the public sector 
and introducing ‘waiting days’ (no pay for the first three days of absence). More 
robust attendance management was also commonly linked to more business-like 
cultures among respondents driven by financial pressure from funders.  
 
I think the social work ethos has always been somebody is ill, they need time 
to rest and recuperate, but the business side is saying this is costing us a great 
deal of money, we cannot sustain that level of sickness because its having an 
impact on the way our finances are working. So it’s a bit more hard-
nosed…the financial pressures are greater and greater and you have to be a 
lot more unscrupulous (HR Director, Adult Services). 
 
 Local authorities were also reportedly scrutinising the balance between front-line 
service work and opportunities for workers to be supervised, fulfil administrative 
responsibilities, and participate in team meetings.  
 
Now you’re having to account for every hour basically. Like workers’ time. If 
somebody is employed full time, thirty-six hours, the local authority wants to 
see thirty-six hours. And so where do the additional bits come in, the 
supervision of staff, the team meetings, the admin, those bits? (Manager, Adult 
services provider). 
 
There were additionally suggestions of more radical changes to employment 
conditions as a consequence of the emergence of the personalisation agenda. The 
Type 1 organisation experiencing the retendering of all of its services reported how it 
had gone as low as it could with making cuts to its current approach to terms and 
conditions. Management was therefore considering moving to administering Direct 
Payments (DP). That is, asking people accessing its services to move out  of the local 
authority’s block grant provision by requesting an individual (DP)  budget which they 
could use to purchaser services from a provider of their choice. At the time of the 
study the number of DPs in Scotland was low and it was the exception for providers 
to switch to their provision in a context where many local authorities were reluctant to 
adopt them because of the administrative difficulties they caused and their association 
with the privatisation of care. The HR respondent in the aforementioned organisation 
reported however, that, by reacting to individual service user demands for care at a 
time that suited their needs, considerable savings could be made. Specifically, staff 
could be moved onto an hourly rate of pay rather than receive an annual salary, and 
self-governing teams could organise shifts and rotas, thus leading to the removal of a 
layer of management. In terms of the implications for job security the HR Director 
stated: 
 
Up until if the individual no longer wanted you, we look to redeploy 
somewhere else, but the future may look a bit more scary. The actual contract 
may be more – that’s your job and if something goes wrong we might look to 
have another job for you, but we might not. 
 
In addition, a Type 2 organisation was implementing dramatic changes to pay and 
conditions, including pay cuts as a consequence of one of its key local authority 
funders linking the move to personalisation with austerity cuts of 20 percent. Unlike 
the aforementioned case, this local authority was taking the initiative because it was 
one of six of Scotland’s 32 authorities piloting the expansion of such individualised 
forms of funding.  
 
Within this context of deteriorating employment conditions, although 10 of the 
organisations recognised trade unions, there appeared limited opportunities for 
workers to express discontent through collective bargaining. Tensions were, however, 
apparent, with one organisation having experienced a ballot for industrial action and 
the above Type 2 organisation having suffered two strikes between 2007- 2009 over 
pay cuts and changes to contracts and sick pay. Each of these actions led to 
concessions by management, but not without reports of tensions with union 
representatives and workers: the latter fearing the impact of their action on service 
users.  
  
In all but a few of the other workplaces union organisation struggled to make an 
impact, with membership density reportedly not reaching higher than 10 – 15 percent. 
Reasons put forward for this included problems recruiting shop stewards, and the 
difficulties of organising a geographically dispersed workforce. There were also 
examples of anti-unionism. Thus, one organisation was reported to be actively 
considering de-recognition. The HR director of another, a traditionally non-union 
organisation which had acquired a union agreement and union members from another 
organisation following a successful tender, admitted that it was waiting for current 
membership to diminish through natural wastage, rather than encourage a further 
union presence. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Using an institutional, inter-organisational and interpersonal framework (Marchington 
and Vincent, 2004), this paper has utilised longitudinal data, gathered through three 
phases of fieldwork over the period 2002-2011, to explore the changing nature of 
social care outsourcing and its implications for employment conditions within 
Scottish voluntary organisations. Findings from phase 1 illustrated how the inter-play 
between institutional, inter-organisational and interpersonal factors created relations 
between service commissioners and voluntary sector providers which varied in terms 
of how far they encompassed obligational dimensions, and how far the latter were 
dependent on the former and consequently capable of resisting unfavourable demands 
from them. In doing so, these first phase findings allowed early papers from this study 
(Cunningham, 2008) to argue that in terms of theorizing voluntary sector – state 
relations there was a need to move away from the dichotomy of ‘partnership’ versus 
‘control and subordination’, and to instead recognise that, like other inter-
organisational relation, they exist along a continuum encompassing varying 
combinations of ‘arms-length’ and obligational elements. In effect the study’s initial 
findings therefore showed that voluntary sector providers could at times utilise 
favourable market conditions, as well as long-established inter-personal relationships, 
to influence the nature of the contractual relationships they had with service 
commissioners.   
 
In contrast, the evidence presented from the latter stages of the research highlighted 
that this capacity to influence had markedly declined against the background of a shift 
in the ‘negotiated order’ of inter-organisational relations in the social care market 
place (Truss, 2004). Central to this shift had been a tougher financial and competitive 
climate. Austerity had reinforced a tendency towards NPM inspired prescriptions and 
encouraged the pursuit of more ‘arms-length’, cost-based contracting. As a 
consequence, the paper revealed the way in which the boundaries between 
organisations exhibiting varying degrees of obligational and ‘arms-length’ relations in 
an area of activity were becoming eroded, and leading to convergence around 
employment conditions. 
 
Marchington and Vincent’s (2004) framework therefore proved, as anticipated, a 
useful analytical tool for understanding the evolving dynamics of social care 
outsourcing. Indeed, the findings obtained can be seen to lend substantial support to 
its validity. At the same time, however, they also served to further reinforce the 
 argument that contracting parties should not be assumed to be mere passive recipients 
of institutional pressures by highlighting how local authorities,  acting as market 
architects, had played a crucial role in operationalising, and prioritising between, 
wider (governmental) institutional pressures. The fact, moreover, that their actions in 
this regard were, for the most part, of a similar nature additionally suggests that in 
exploring how meta-level institutional pressures impact on the contracting behaviour 
of outsourcing organisations account potentially needs to be taken of the way in 
which horizontal learning and other linkages between them can serve as an important 
channel of mediating influence: at least in market monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market contexts.     
 
More specifically, the findings revealed how operating in a context of austerity local 
authorities have commonly been creating market dynamics whereby softer 
institutional pressures designed to forge collaborative relationships between 
purchasers and providers have tended to become subverted to meet the paramount 
objective of cost savings. In particular, they were shown to have been utilising 
Approved Providers Lists (APL) PL processes, previously designed to regulate 
quality standards and human resource policies and processes, to exert downward cost 
pressures, while also dismantling the antecedents of ‘partnership’ through replacing 
close personal ties between voluntary organisation boundary spanners and purchaser 
personnel with more distant links with experts in finance and procurement. With 
regard, for example, to the introduction of personalisation, it appeared that potentially 
common purchaser – provider interests in such goals as user choice and person 
centeredness, were tending to be undermined by NPM style demands for efficiency 
and value for money. 
 
In this environment of austerity, retendering and an emerging focus on 
personalisation, the capacity of voluntary organisations to protect staff terms and 
conditions had declined as the boundaries between the different types of organisation 
eroded. A trend highlighted by the fact that all of the organisations that had persisted 
in paying local authority terms and conditions in the first phase of fieldwork were 
now considering or were definitely moving away from retaining this linkage. As a 
result, the notion of voluntary organisations mimicking public sector employment 
conditions was found to be evaporating. Instead, they appeared to be being 
increasingly dragged towards a converging employment model based on low pay and 
skills, and limited access to sickness, pension and other benefits.  
 
This weakening of the market positions of voluntary sector providers had occurred 
alongside a limited ability on the part of unions - where recognised- to significantly 
counter the downward trend in employment conditions. As a result developments in 
the social care market can be seen to add weight to the argument of Greer et al (2011) 
that the employment implications of public service outsourcing are fundamentally 
shaped by the nature of the funding regimes involved, rather than the surrounding 
industrial relations institutions. Insofar as this is correct, it consequently points to the 
importance of unions focussing their activities beyond the workplace and 
organisational levels in order to more effectively influence funding arrangements both 
directly and indirectly through the regulation of external labour markets and the 
related taking of terms and conditions out of competition (see e.g. Cunningham and 
James, 2010; Wills, 2009). For example, by pursuing such actions as the re-
establishment of the recently rescinded ‘two-tier code’ that extended public sector 
 terms and conditions to those working on transferred public services in the voluntary 
sector, and the promotion of bi-partite/tri-partite ‘sectoral forums’ which engage in 
collective bargaining over pay and conditions, skills and training (Short, 2011; 
UNITE, 2011).  
 
Two (somewhat contradictory) caveats to the above analysis must, however, be 
voiced. The first is that it is uncertain to what extent all of the noted employment-
related changes in the sector are permanent. Such changes to employment conditions 
in the sector, particularly reducing pay in response to competitive financial pressures, 
eradication of other employment benefits, and dilution of skills do admittedly 
resemble changes associated with the marketisation thesis (Sennett, 1998). However, 
other studies have highlighted how pressures to marketise employment conditions are 
particularly acute in times of recession as employers react to short-term turbulence. In 
times of recovery, however, there may be efforts by employers to recover and reinvest 
in things such as internal career systems because employees commitment and loyalty 
continue to need to be nurtured (McGovern, et al, 2007). In the case of this study 
there may be some, albeit limited, recovery in employment conditions. In general, 
however, such a process of recovery would appear unlikely given the apparent 
permanence of the changes to pay and other terms and conditions within the 
organisations that first experienced them in phase 1 of the fieldwork. 
 
In a similar vein, it is necessarily unclear how far the present findings can be 
extrapolated to other areas of public service outsourcing. It cannot, for example, be 
simply assumed that external providers, particularly where they comprise large 
private sector organisations, will always occupy vulnerable market positions vis a vis 
public sector commissioners (Grimshaw et al, 2002). This said, the analysis provided 
does suggest  that public service commissioners in times of austerity have leant 
towards price-based, short-term ‘arms-length’ contracting that is not easily challenged 
by ‘soft’ government prescription, particularly in a period of significant financial 
stringency. Given also the existence of much international and domestic evidence 
pointing more generally to how the competitive dynamics involved in the outsourcing 
of public services commonly lead to downward pressure on workers’ terms and 
conditions (Baines, 2004; Baines, 2011; McDonald and Charlesworth, 2011; Wills, 
2009), it would therefore seem at least reasonable to argue that this study’s findings 
may be a harbinger of things to come in some other areas of public service 
outsourcing.  
 
What does seem clear, however, is a continued need for research centred on the 
changing nature of public service outsourcing and its impact on employment 
conditions in areas of expanding public service externalisation. On the basis of this 
study, it would also seem important that this research agenda encompass a strong 
longitudinal dimension given the capacity of such research to provide valuable in-
depth insights into the dynamics of such outsourcing and its employment-related 
implications. 
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Table 1: Profile of participating organisations 
Activity     Phase 1 –  
    2002 
 Phase 2 –     
2008/09 
   Phase 3 
   2011 
Learning disabilities 6 6 1 
Mental health 2 1 - 
Physical disabilities 3 2 1 
The elderly 3 1 - 
Children and Young 
people 
4 3 - 
Mixture of the above 6 5 - 
Total 24 18 2 
    
Union recognition 13 11 2 
 
 
 
Table 2: Variability in vulnerability to NPM cost pressures 
Organisation Type Pattern of resource dependency Ability to enhance their 
market/funding 
positions 
Type 1 –Ten 
respondents 
Highly transactional relations – 
Reliant on one or two funding bodies; 
Narrow geographic region; Operating 
Struggle to make use of 
any of identified 
strategy. 
 in adult services; Small to medium-
sized organisations; One year 
contracts, renewal not guaranteed; few 
inflationary uplifts on income; 
subsidizing contracts from reserves. 
 
Type 2 – Ten 
respondents 
Variable relations with funders; 
Greater diversity in funding sources 
across 32 local authorities; Larger 
providers in adult services or variety 
of service users. Inflationary increases 
from some funders. 
 
Able to deploy one or 
two. 
Type 3 – Four 
respondents 
Variable relations with funders, but 
identified as niche providers on APLs 
by some local authorities. Close 
personal contacts with boundary 
spanning agents. Partnerships in 
designing & establishing new 
Services; healthy financial reserves. 
Ability to make use of 
all of strategies. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Changes to terms and conditions 2002 – 2008/09 
Stage 1 (n=24) Yes No Intended 
Moving away 
from public sector 
pay scales 
 
13 10 1 
Stage 2 (n = 18) Yes  No plans Intended 
Moved or 
planning to move 
away from public 
sector pay scales 
 
8 0 10 
Changes to 
pension 
entitlement 
 
2 13 3 
Changes to sick 
pay entitlement 
12 4 2 
 
Table 4: Changes to Terms and Conditions – Phase 2 
 Moved away from public sector conditions by phase 1 Retained public sector conditions in phase 1 but change in phase 2 
Organisation
s 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Changes to Pay and 
conditions – moving 
from local authority 
scales 
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ A A √ √ √ √ A A √ √ 
 Organisational Type Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
√ = Made change 
A     = Anticipating change 
 
 
Table 5: Inter-organisational relations and employment impact – two case study analysis 
Phases of 
fieldwork  
Phase 1 interviews 2001/02 Phase 2 interviews – 2008 Phase 3 interviews 2010/11 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 Case 1 Case 2 
Organisational 
level factors 
High dependency on 3 – 4 
organisations. 
Short-term commitments, 
sometimes as little as one year 
contracts. 
Broad base funding among 
30 of Scotland’s local 
authorities. 
Mixture of one year and 
longer funding 
arrangements. 
Significant 
funding from 
Supporting 
People monies, 
but subject to 
changing 
priorities. 
Limited monies from 
Supporting People. 
Concerns over 
impact of savings 
and efficiencies.  
Reduction in funding 
ranging from 5 – 7%. 
Pressure on hourly 
rates with local 
authorities 
Reductions in funding 
from funders of 5%. 
Pressure on hourly rates 
with local authorities 
Inter-personal 
level factors 
Limited personal, face-to-face 
contacts  
 
Mixture of relations with 
different local authorities - 
more obligational ones 
encouraging close ties  
Limited personal, 
face-to-face 
contacts  
 
 
Mixture of relations 
with different 
authorities more 
obligational ones 
encouraging close 
ties. 
Limited personal, 
face-to-face contacts  
 
Deterioration in 
personal contacts, 
finance departments of 
funders increasingly 
influential. 
 Employment Implications 
HR Policies/ 
procedures 
Upgrade policies and 
procedures to with local 
authority practice 
Upgrade policies and 
procedures to local 
authority practice 
Training boosted 
for SVQ 
Training boosted for 
SVQ 
- Provide only statutory 
training. 
Terms & 
conditions 
Pay-freeze, increasing working 
week (39 -40 hours). 
Regular pay increases, but 
delayed while funding was 
secured from multiple 
sources. 
Cost of living 
awards for 6 
years - pay freeze 
by 2008.  
Maternity & 
paternity benefits 
above minimum. 
38 hour working 
week  
Reduced pension 
Management 
discussions 
regarding reforming 
pay scales, 
introducing support 
assistants. 
Pay cuts, changes to 
sick pay, pensions. 
Stopping sleepovers 
Working week to 39 
hours. 
Statutory minimum 
for maternity and 
paternity. 
Recruit lower cost 
support assistants. 
Pay cuts for those at top 
of scale and freeze for 
remainder 
Future recruitment of 
lower paid Support 
Assistants  
Cut life and health 
insurance. 
Reduce sick pay 
entitlements 
Reduce on-call and shift 
pay  
Job security - - Reducing back 
office/admin 
staff. 
- Compulsory 
redundancies 
No replacing of back 
office staff who left. 
 
 
